The mistake, error, or omission of the registry or registrar is not to be visited on an innocent, diligent, litigant. It would be against all legal principles to do so. Thus, a prospective appellant is not to be shut out simply because a court official refused to perform his duty. To do so would be to grant court or registry officials unbridled powers to put an end to a litigant’s right of appeal. The right of appeal is constitutional, and it is far too important to be left to the indiscretion of the official of a court registry. The situation would be different where Practice Directions place the duty to do a thing on a party to the proceedings or his counsel. For instance, unlike the filing of a brief of argument, which is within the province of a party, the compilation of records is purely by the court Registrar or Tribunal’s Secretary. In the instant case, the 1st respondent acted properly when she took charge of her own fate by compiling and transmitting the record when the Registrar of the trial court failed in the performance of his duty. The 1st respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal. After the notice of appeal was filed, the registrar of the trial court failed/refused/neglected to compile and transmit the record of appeal to the Court of Appeal within the time stipulated by the Election Judicial Proceedings Practice Directions, 2022, which necessitated the 1st respondent compiling and transmitting the record on her own. The 1st respondent equally filed a motion on notice seeking an order of the Court of Appeal extending the time within which to compile and transmit the record of appeal. In the circumstance, it would have been unfair and unjust for the lower court to make the 1st respondent suffer for the lapses of the Registrar. (Supreme Court of Nigeria in ONUBOGU V. ANAZONWU – SC/CV/238/2023 – Delivered Friday, 17th March 2023).

Per JAURO, J.S.C :

“In this case, the 1st respondent has not been shown to have condoned the lapses or tardiness of the Registrar of the trial court, hence there was no basis for the appellant’s contention that the lower court ought not to have extended time for the 1st respondent to compile and transmit the record of appeal. The appellant herein has sought to distinguish the instant appeal from the case of Maku v. Sule (supra) by arguing that it was the Secretary of the tribunal who compiled and transmitted the record in that case, while the 1st respondent personally compiled and transmitted the record in the instant case. I have to confess that I do not understand what the appellant seeks to achieve by this so-called distinction. Is he suggesting that once the Secretary of a tribunal or the Registrar of the trial court refuses to perform his duty, a prospective appellant’s right of appeal should forever be lost? That would be a truly ridiculous proposition.”